The Contagion of Interstate Violence: Perceived International Images and Threat Explain Why Countries Repeatedly Engage in Interstate Wars by Li, Mengyao
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst 
Masters Theses Dissertations and Theses 
March 2015 
The Contagion of Interstate Violence: Perceived International 
Images and Threat Explain Why Countries Repeatedly Engage in 
Interstate Wars 
Mengyao Li 
University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/masters_theses_2 
Recommended Citation 
Li, Mengyao, "The Contagion of Interstate Violence: Perceived International Images and Threat Explain 
Why Countries Repeatedly Engage in Interstate Wars" (2015). Masters Theses. 156. 
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/masters_theses_2/156 
This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Masters Theses by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 
 THE CONTAGION OF INTERSTATE VIOLENCE: PERCEIVED INTERNATIONAL 
IMAGES AND THREAT EXPLAIN WHY COUNTRIES REPEATEDLY ENGAGE IN 
INTERSTATE WARS 
 
A Thesis Presented 
by 
MENGYAO LI 
Submitted to the Graduate School of  
the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of 
 
 




Department of Psychology 
 
The Contagion of Interstate Violence: Perceived International Images and Threat Explain 
Why Countries Repeatedly Engage in Interstate Wars 
 
 





Approved as to style and content by: 
 
 
Bernhard Leidner, Chair 
 
 
Brian Lickel, Member 
 
 
Leah Wing, Member 
 
 
    Melinda Novak, Department Head 
           Psychology Department
	  	   	   	  iii	  
ABSTRACT 
THE CONTAGION OF INTERSTATE VIOLENCE: PERCEIVED INTERNATIONAL 
IMAGES AND THREAT EXPLAIN WHY COUNTRIES REPEATEDLY ENGAGE IN 
INTERSTATE WARS 
FEBRUARY 2015 
MENGYAO LI, B.A., BARD COLLEGE 
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professor Bernhard Leidner 
Three experiments investigated the phenomenon of war contagion in the context of 
international relations, hypothesizing that past inter- (but not intra-) state war will 
facilitate future, unrelated interstate war. Americans showed stronger support for violent 
responses to new, unrelated interstate tensions after being reminded of an historical war 
between the U.S. and another state, as compared to an historical domestic war within the 
U.S. (Study 1). This war contagion effect was mediated by heightened perceived threat 
from, and negative images of, a fictitious country unrelated to the past war, indicating a 
generalized effect of past interstate war on perceived threat/images from any foreign 
country. The war contagion effect was further moderated by national glorification (Study 
2). Largely replicating these effects with an additional baseline condition, Study 3 yielded 
further support for the generalized effect of past interstate war on perceived threat and 
images, this time with a real third-party country.  
 
Keywords: interstate violence, war contagion, intergroup threat, image, ingroup 
identification/ glorification 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most well-established phenomena in the psychological literature on 
aggressive and violent behavior is that violence begets violence. In a wide variety of 
contexts – from child abuse, to homicide, to community violence – scholars of aggression 
have demonstrated that suffering, committing, or even observing violence increases the 
likelihood of engaging in violent acts against others in the future (Bandura, 1973; 
Goldstein, Davis, & Herman, 1975; Huesmann, 2011; Patel, Simon, & Taylor, 2013; 
Widom, 1989a, b). While the “violence begets violence” hypothesis has been extensively 
researched in the realm of interpersonal relations, empirical research on the radiating 
effect of violence among large social groups such as nation states is limited. Is interstate 
violence also contagious in the sense that a state’s past engagement in violent conflict 
with another state can predispose its citizens to supporting future violent conflict against 
other, third-party states? If so, what are the psychological processes underlying such 
contagion of interstate violence?  
In the current contribution, we argue that when reminded of a historical interstate 
war, citizens of the participating states will perceive other third-party states as more 
threatening and dangerous. Such heightened perceived threat of other third-party states 
will in turn increase these third-party states’ negative images in the eye of citizens from 
the observing state, which will eventually lead to citizens’ support for violence in 
response to contemporary tensions with third-party states. 
1.1 The Contagion of Interstate Violence 
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 Events between two states rarely affect only the states involved. They often 
percolate through each state’s respective networks, (re-)shaping each state’s relations 
with other third-party states. Throughout history, conflicts and wars between two nations 
have created “traps” that draw other nations into their grasp. International relations 
scholars often refer to this phenomenon as contagion, or diffusion, of war (Houweling & 
Siccama, 1985; Kedera, 1998; Levy, 1982; Most & Starr, 1990; Siverson & Starr, 1991). 
The logic of war contagion, in its original form, is that the spread of war is rather 
immediate both temporarily and spatially, directly associated with the original war. More 
recent scholarship in the field of international politics has extended this notion by 
examining the influence of a state’s historical ties with other states on its present and 
future foreign relations (Crescenzi, 2007). In this case, it has been argued that two states 
are more likely to engage in war if one of them perceives the other as having a history of 
hostile interactions with other third-party states. 
While interstate relations can become more violent due to a state’s reputation for 
hostility, we propose another, perhaps more direct form and cause of violence contagion 
across space and time. Interstate violence can spread, we argue, because a state’s prior 
experience of interstate violence makes its own citizens more prone to perceiving any 
other state (including third-party states not involved in the original violence) as hostile 
and threatening to their own state, and therefore more likely to behave violently in the 
face of new interstate tensions with any other state. After the invasion of Afghanistan, for 
example, the U.S. placed several other states, even those unrelated to Afghanistan or 9/11, 
on an “axis of evil.” One of the states on this axis was Iraq, which was subsequently 
invaded by the U.S. in 2003. Certainly, states behave violently toward other states for a 
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variety of reasons other than their historical engagement in interstate violence. In fact, 
defending national interests is a rhetoric that political leaders commonly employ when 
justifying their decisions to go to war. Behaviors of ordinary citizens, however, rarely 
follow such rational-choice models, especially in the context of intergroup conflict (e.g., 
Long & Brecke, 2003). Thus, our war contagion hypothesis above by no means rejects 
other explanations for violent interstate behaviors. Rather, it offers a complementary 
outlook on why countries repeatedly engage in interstate violence, particularly from the 
perspective of ordinary people, and their support for war. 
Against the background of war contagion theory, it is important to note that a 
state’s prior experience of violence, as we argue, will only spill over to new interstate 
situations when the prior violence has been between, not within (e.g. intra-state violence, 
such as civil war, political violence within a state), states. This is because past 
engagement in interstate violence will likely provide information that people use to 
generalize, accurately or not, to other foreign states. Information provided by past intra-
state violence, on the other hand, should not be used by people to generalize it to other 
foreign states—though it may arguably be used to generalize to other groups within the 
state.1 With this distinction between different types of violence in mind, we consider past 
intrastate violence an important and methodologically rigorous comparison to past 
interstate violence when examining the contagion of interstate violence through the 
generalization of perceived threat and negative images of foreign states. 
1.2 Attitude Generalization 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Indeed, conflict between different subgroups also seems to perpetuate itself—countries that have 
experienced one civil war are more likely to experience a second or third civil war compared to those that 
have no prior history of civil war (Walter, 2004).  The contagion of intrastate violence, however, is not the 
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 While psychological research has not empirically examined the contagion of 
interstate violence – specifically, how and why past experiences of violence affect 
citizens’ reactions to new interstate tensions with unrelated third states – it has shed 
innovative light on the generalization of attitudes from old intergroup conflicts to new 
conflicts with unrelated third parties. In one study, Wohl and Branscombe (2009) showed 
that a reminder of historical ingroup victimization (i.e., attack on Pearl Harbor by the 
Japanese) was sufficient to elicit collective angst, or the concern about the future vitality 
of one’s ingroup, among American participants. This concern subsequently motivated 
ingroup-protective actions in current intergroup situations—participants expressed more 
forgiveness of the harm Americans committed in the Iraq war. In another study, 
Americans and Canadians showed dramatically less favorable attitudes toward foreigners 
and immigrants after the attacks of 9/11, 2001, regardless of whether or not their origins 
were related to the attackers (Esses, Dovidio, & Hodson, 2002). Similarly, Americans 
showed increased support for war and violence in general after being reminded of the 
9/11 attacks (Carnagey & Anderson, 2007). And in their research on schadenfreude, 
Leach and Spears (2009) demonstrated that when one’s own national group was outshone 
by a second nation, the dejection at such defeat can lead to feelings of schadenfreude 
toward the misfortune of an uninvolved third nation (see also Leach, Spears, Branscombe, 
Doosje, 2003, Study 2). Importantly, dislike of the second nation predicted schadenfreude 
toward the third nation, which in turn promoted negative evaluations of the third nation. 
These findings lend tangential support to the notion that negative interstate experience in 
the past can have important implications for how citizens view and interact with other 
states in the future. 
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While the above-mentioned studies focused mainly on the mechanisms (e.g., 
collective angst, schadenfreude) underlying effects of past intergroup experiences on 
present intergroup relations, these mechanisms themselves are not of primary importance 
to our present research. They do, however, collectively speak to a more general 
psychological phenomenon that is of importance here: attitude generalization. The 
attitude generalization effect has been demonstrated in many different domains, 
suggesting that attitudes toward one object can generalize to other objects (e.g., Bouman, 
Zomeren, & Otten, 2013; Pettigrew, 1997, 2009; Ranganath & Nosek, 2008; Shook, 
Fazio, & Eiser, 2007). In the context of interstate violence, we propose that attitude 
generalization occurs when hostility toward one state generalizes to other states that were 
not involved in the original interstate conflict. Specifically, as we explain below, the 
psychological mechanisms underlying this violence generalization are heightened 
perceived negative images of other countries in general and the associated realistic and 
symbolic threats they pose to the perceiver’s own country. 
1.3 International Images and Intergroup Threat 
 International image theory, originally developed by international relations 
scholars, posits that perceptions of actors on the international stage are organized into 
different schemas, stereotypes, or images (Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999; 
Alexander, Levin, & Henry, 2005; Cottam, 1977; Herrmann, Voss, Schooler, & Ciarrochi, 
1997; Herrmann, Tetlock, & Visser, 1999). According to the theory, perceived images 
stem primarily from ongoing relationships between nations and serve to guide or justify 
strategic action and policy choices in international affairs. Image theorists have identified 
five major images in the international arena: enemy, ally, imperialist, dependent, and 
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barbarian. The enemy image arises when the relationship between two international 
actors of comparable power and cultural sophistication is characterized by intense 
competition and threat. In direct contrast to the enemy image, the ally image derives from 
a rather cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship between actors that also share 
similar status. The imperialist image arises when the observer perceives another actor as 
more powerful and culturally similar or superior, thus possessing both the capability and 
opportunity to exploit the observer (e.g., colonizers in the eyes of their current or future 
colonies). The complement to the imperialist image is the dependent image that pictures 
the target country as vulnerable and inferior, presenting the opportunity for the more 
powerful observer to take control over. Finally, the barbarian image portrays the target as 
more culturally backward and yet more powerful as compared to the observer.  
Building upon image theory, we propose that not only does one state’s relation 
with a second state shape the images of that second state, but it can also generalize 
beyond the specific interstate context to affect perceived images of unrelated third-party 
states (i.e. images of “other states in general”). Thus, reminders of past interstate war 
between the observer’s own state and another will likely increase his or her perceived 
negative images (i.e., enemy, imperialist, dependent, or barbarian) and decrease his or her 
perceived positive images (i.e., ally) of any foreign states in general. It is unclear, 
however, whether this generalization effect will increase perceptions of any kind of 
negative images or limit to negative images that reflect specific structural relations 
between the target and perceiver’s own country (e.g. imperialist). 
As mentioned earlier, image theory postulates that perceived threat from a target 
state plays a crucial role in the initial formation of images of that state. It is plausible, 
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then, that an increase in perceived threat drives the hypothesized effects of engaging in 
past violent conflict on perceived images of other states. Based on past research on 
intergroup threat, we explored perceptions of threat to both the ingroup’s physical 
existence and wellbeing, as well as its cherished values and principles. The more tangible 
threat is often referred to as realistic threat, pertaining to perceiving the outgroup as 
endangering the existence (e.g., through warfare), political or economic power, the 
physical or material well-being of the ingroup or its members (LeVine & Campbell, 
1972; Sherif & Sherif, 1953; 1979). In contrast, symbolic threat concerns dangers to the 
ingroup “way of life” due to perceived group differences in values, norms, standards, and 
worldviews (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). As such, both realistic and symbolic threat might 
evoke perceptions of negative international images.  
Integrating research on intergroup threat and international images, we propose 
that reminders of one’s state’s past engagement in violence against another state will 
elicit generalized perceptions of symbolic and realistic threat from previously uninvolved 
third-party states, which will in turn result in increased perceived negative international 
images. Negative images, according to image theory, should then lead to preferences for 
aggressive foreign policies in response to new interstate tensions (see Figure 1). Adding 
another layer of complexity to the proposed war contagion process, and in keeping with 
literature on attitude generalization, the target country of perceived threats and images 
does not necessarily have to be the same as the target country of foreign policies. In other 
words, perceived threats from and negative images of a foreign country can further 
generalize to influence policy preferences regarding yet other foreign countries. 
 
  
	  	   	   	  8	  
CHAPTER 2 
STUDY 1 
Study 1 tested the main hypothesis that reminding people of their country’s 
engagement in past interstate (but not intrastate) violence will increase their support for 
violence in response to new interstate tensions with other countries, and that this effect 
will be explained by heightened negative perceptions of third-party states in general. To 
examine this hypothesis, we assessed American participants’ reactions to both real and 
hypothetical contemporary tensions between the U.S. and other nations after being 
reminded of either the American Revolutionary War (interstate conflict2) or the American 
Civil War (intrastate conflict). The American Civil War was introduced as a rigorous 
control condition to assess whether increased preference for violent foreign policy is 
simply a normative response to reminders of intergroup violence in general, or, as we 
argue, a more specific response to interstate violence in particular. We predicted that 
Americans will react more hostilely to current tensions between the U.S. and other 
foreign countries after the reminder of the Revolutionary War as compared to that of the 
Civil War. To further investigate whether war contagion is driven by generalized 
perceived threats from and negative images of any foreign state, in Study 1 we assessed 
perceived threats and images of a fictitious, but allegedly real, country as a “stand-in” for 
third-party states in general. Given that participants had no knowledge of this fictitious 
state’s foreign relations, using a fictitious country as the target state provided a stringent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Strictly speaking, the American Revolutionary War did not begin as an interstate conflict due to the 
colonial status of the United States. However, it gradually grew into an international war and is now 
arguably remembered more as an interstate war rather than a civil war by the American public. 
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test of whether, and to what extent, past interstate violence can change the perceived 
threat and image of a completely uninvolved third-party state.  
2.1. Method 
2.1.1 Participants. The sample consisted of 194 Americans recruited through Amazon’s 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Our screening of the data quality resulted in the exclusion of 
three participants who did not pay sufficient attention to the manipulation materials (as 
indicated by their summaries of the manipulation materials and incorrect answers to 
attention check questions), five participants who spent significantly more time reading 
the manipulation materials than the rest of the sample, and 22 multivariate outliers 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Although we excluded approximately 15% of the total 
sample, the exclusion rate was similar to the average benchmarks for online studies 
(Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2013). 164 participants were retained for data analysis 
(40% men; age M = 35, SD = 12.81). 
2.1.2 Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to read a fictitious, but allegedly 
real, New York Times article depicting either the American Civil War (intrastate war 
condition) or the American Revolutionary War (interstate war condition). In the intrastate 
war condition, participants read about the vast cultural and political differences between 
the American South and North, which eventually led to the outbreak of the American 
Civil War. In the interstate war condition, participants read about the mounting tensions 
between Great Britain and what is now the United States prior to and during the 
Revolutionary War. To minimize the differences between the two articles, the 
descriptions of the Civil War and the Revolutionary War were identical in terms of 
casualty numbers and injuries. Although the numbers of deaths and injuries were thus 
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inaccurate, no participant raised suspicion in the summaries of the articles or at the end of 
the study. To rule out the possibility that any observed effect is due to the perceived intra- 
versus inter-group nature of the conflict, we also emphasized in both articles that the war 
was one of the most costly instances of intergroup warfare in the sense that two groups 
were in conflict with each other. Furthermore, both articles ended on a rather positive 
note, emphasizing the abolition of slavery in the Civil War condition and the 
independence of the U.S. in the Revolutionary War condition. 
After the reading task, participants completed several manipulation checks. To 
ensure that participants read the article carefully, they also summarized it in their own 
words. Then they filled out the dependent measures in the order outlined below. All items 
were measured on 9-point analog visual scales (1=strongly disagree; 9=strongly agree) 
unless noted otherwise. At the end of the study participants reported their demographic 
information and were fully debriefed.  
2.1.3 Materials. 
2.1.3.1 Manipulation check. After reading the article, participants answered three 
questions to indicate the extent to which they perceived the conflict depicted in the article 
as 1. two groups fighting against each other; 2. a domestic/civil war; 3. an international 
war. 
2.1.3.2 Symbolic and realistic threat. Adapted from Stephan et al. (1998, 1999), two 
items measured symbolic threat posed by perceived differences in values and cultures 
between the U.S. and a fictitious country called Coebia (e.g., “Coebia is a threat to 
American culture.”). Two items measured realistic threat posed by military or economic 
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competition between the U.S. and Coebia (“Coebia’s military development poses a 
threat to U.S. interests.”). 
2.1.3.3 International Images. We examined participants’ perceptions of three 
international images: ally, enemy, and imperialist. Ally and enemy images are the most 
widely studied images, which are also the most central to contemporary international 
relations. The imperialist image, in addition, is highly relevant to the American 
Revolution against the British Empire. Adapted from Alexander et al. (2005), perceived 
images of Coebia were assessed using three sub-scales tapping the three different images, 
respectively.  Each image was measured with two items (e.g., Ally: “Coebia is good-
willed toward other countries;” Enemy: “Coebia has hostile intentions toward others;” 
Imperialist: “Coebia exploits other countries and keeps all the profits for itself.”). 
2.1.3.4 Support for violent responses to current interstate tensions. To measure support 
for violent and nonviolent solutions to new interstate tensions in general, participants 
were presented, in random order, with six short descriptions of military and economic 
tensions between the U.S. and other countries. We included six different conflict 
scenarios to increase the variability of interstate tensions, and intended to use them as a 
single scale, measuring generalized attitudes toward unrelated interstate tensions. Our 
selection of multiple scenarios also echoes the recent call for employing multiple versions 
of the constructs of interest (Monin & Oppenheimer, 2014). Of the six conflict scenarios, 
one described the nuclear program in Iran as a potential threat to the U.S. and its allies; 
one described the recent nuclear threats issued by North Korea; one described America’s 
increasing economic and trade tensions with China; one described the military tensions 
between the U.S. and Russia. In addition to countries that currently have real tensions 
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with the U.S., we also examined participants’ reactions to hypothetical, but allegedly real, 
tensions between the U.S. and countries with which the U.S. has neutral or rather 
amicable relationships.  Two scenarios described hypothetical tensions between the U.S. 
and Australia as well as the Netherlands, respectively. Participants were instructed to 
imagine that they were in the position to decide what course of action their country 
should take in response to those tensions. Participants indicated the extent to which they 
favored military strategies (e.g., use of force) to address the tensions (1 = not at all; 9 = 
very much). 
2.2 Results and Discussion 
2.2.1 Manipulation checks. As expected, participants in the intrastate (M = 7.59) and 
interstate war (M = 7.86) conditions did not differ significantly in their perceptions of the 
violent conflict described in the article as two groups fighting against each other, F(1, 
163) = 0.93, p = .336, η2 = .01. Participants in the interstate war condition perceived the 
conflict significantly less as a domestic/civil war (M = 4.03) compared to those in the 
intrastate war condition (M = 8.03), F(1, 163) = 129.88, p < .001, η2 = .45. Conversely, 
participants in the interstate war condition perceived the conflict significantly more as an 
international conflict (M = 6.80) than participants in the intrastate war condition (M = 
2.45), F(1, 163) = 142.20, p < .001, η2 = .47. 
2.2.2 Main Analyses. 
2.2.2.1 Analytical strategy. Because we hypothesized that reminders of past interstate 
violence would influence attitudes toward contemporary tensions with other, unrelated 
countries in general, we first treated the six conflict scenarios as a single scale. The scale 
demonstrated satisfactory reliability (α = .82) and loaded onto a single factor. Thus, we 
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first used the composite score for participants’ responses across all six scenarios as the 
dependent variable (DV), regardless of possible differences between scenarios (e.g. 
different target countries, different types or severity levels of tension). Although the scale 
was reliable and unidimensional, it is important to ensure that any within-subject effects 
representing such differences were non-significant and did not alter the effect of 
condition on the DV. Thus, we also ran a mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), in which 
condition was entered as a between-subjects variable and conflict scenario as a within-
subject variable. Results from both analyses converged, thus we only report below the 
analysis with all six scenarios combined as the DV (see Supplementary Materials for 
results of the mixed ANOVA). 
2.2.2.2 Support for violent responses to current interstate tensions. To assess whether 
participants were more supportive of violent responses to current, unrelated interstate 
tensions after the past interstate violence reminder, we submitted the composite score for 
support for future violence against the six foreign countries (M = 3.71, SD = 1.69) as the 
DV to a t-test using the general linear model (GLM) procedure in SAS 9.3. This 
procedure outputs F, not t, values. Therefore Fs are reported throughout this paper; note 
that F equals t2. The analysis yielded a marginally significant effect of condition, F(1, 
163) = 3.59, p = .060, η2 = .02 (LCI = .00, UCI = .08). As predicted, participants 
supported future interstate violence somewhat more strongly after reading about interstate 
war (M = 3.98) as compared to intrastate war (M = 3.49). 
2.2.2.3 Symbolic and realistic threat. Due to the strong correlation between symbolic and 
realistic threat (r = .94), we first conducted a factor analysis to test whether these two 
types of threat are indeed two distinct constructs in our data. Only one factor emerged, 
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however, indicating that we should treat symbolic and realistic threat as one construct in 
the subsequent analyses (as suggested by a scree plot and the “Eigenvalue > 1” criterion; 
see Table 1 for the factor loading patterns).3 A GLM with perceived threat from Coebia 
as the DV (α = .96, M = 3.85, SD = 1.76) revealed a significant effect of condition, such 
that participants who had been reminded of interstate war reported significantly greater 
perceived threat (M = 4.42) compared to participants who had been reminded of intrastate 
war (M = 3.45), F(1, 159) = 8.56, p = .004, η2 = .05 (LCI = .01, UCI = .13). 
2.2.2.4 International images. We also conducted a factor analysis on all international 
image items to test whether the three subscales indeed measured three distinct images in 
our study: enemy, imperialist, and ally.4 Two factors emerged from the analysis (as 
suggested by a scree plot and the “Eigenvalue > 1” criterion; see Table 2 for the factor 
loading patterns). Items for enemy and imperialist images loaded onto a single factor, 
while items for ally image defined the second factor. Although enemy and imperialist 
images are considered two distinct constructs according to image theory, their factor 
loadings indicate that they should be treated as one single construct in our data.5 
Therefore, we created a new variable, negative image (α = .97, M = 4.22, SD = 1.52), 
including both enemy and imperialist image. The analysis revealed a significant effect of 
condition on negative image, F(1, 159) = 5.67, p = .018, η2 = .03 (LCI = .00, UCI = .11). 
Consistent with our hypothesis, participants reported greater perceived negative image of 
Coebia after being reminded of interstate war (M = 4.50) as compared to intrastate war 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 The following results are virtually the same if we treat symbolic and realistic threat as two separate 
variables. 
4 We also conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to test whether perceived threat and negative images 
were distinct constructs. The analysis revealed that while threat and negative images were positively 
correlated, the model that freely estimated the correlation between these variables fitted significantly better 
than the model that fixed the correlation to 1 (equivalent to a model collapsing across factors into one 
factor), indicating that threat and images were distinct factors. 
5 The following results were virtually the same if we treated both images as separate variables. 
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(M = 3.93). The same analysis with perceived ally image of Coebia (α = .96, M = 4.88, 
SD = 1.54) as the DV, however, did not yield a significant effect of condition, F(1, 159) 
= 1.25, p = .265, η2 = .01 (LCI = .00, UCI = .06). The interstate war reminder did not 
decrease the perceived ally image as compared to the intrastate war reminder. 
2.2.3 Mediational Analyses. 
To test our hypothesized multi-step mediational model of the effect of condition 
on support for future interstate violence through (a) perceived threat, and (b) perceived 
images of foreign countries (see Figure 1), we conducted two sets of mediational analyses 
with 5,000 bootstrap samples and 95% confidence intervals (one analysis for each of the 
two steps of our model), and a path model testing the whole model at once.6 In the first 
set of mediational analyses, condition was introduced as the IV, perceived threat as the 
mediator, and perceived negative image and ally image as the DVs, respectively (Hayes, 
2012, model 4). In line with our mediational hypothesis, there was a significant indirect 
effect of condition on perceived negative image through perceived threat (boot coefficient 
= .23, LCI = .079, UCI = .400). In line with the non-significant effect of condition on ally 
image reported above, the indirect effect of condition on perceived ally image through 
threat was not significant (boot coefficient = .04, LCI = -.018, UCI = .159).  
In the second set of mediational analyses, condition was introduced as the IV, 
perceived negative image and ally image as the mediators, and support for future 
interstate violence as the DV. Consistent with our mediational hypothesis, the indirect 
effect of condition on support for violence through perceived negative image was 
significant (boot coefficient = .05, LCI = .005, UCI = .150). The indirect effect of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  As path analysis only provides evidence for indirect effects but not for mediation, separate meditational 
analyses were necessary to establish the mediating roles of threats and images.	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condition through perceived ally image, however, was not (boot coefficient = .01, LCI = -
.010, UCI = .070).  
To test all steps of our mediational model simultaneously, we conducted a path 
analysis, in which condition was entered as an exogenous variable, and perceived threat, 
negative and ally images, and support for future interstate violence were entered as 
endogenous variables. Mirroring our GLMs described above, we modeled the effect of 
condition on perceived threat as the “step 1 mediator.” Perceived threat in turn affected 
perceived negative image as the “step 2 mediator,” which then affected support for future 
interstate violence as the ultimate outcome variable. The model, as depicted in Figure 2, 
fit the data well, with the desirable non-significant exact-fit index,χ2(5) = 4.29, p = .508, 
and very good close-fit indices, CFI = 1.00, NFI = .97, SRMSR = .04. Significance and 
directions of the paths were in line with our expectations. We also tested several 
alternative models using both mediation and path analyses (see Supplementary 
Materials). 
Study 1 provided preliminary evidence for our war contagion hypothesis. When 
reminded of the ingroup’s own conflict behavior in the past, people are more likely to 
adopt aggressive approaches to resolving new tensions with previously uninvolved third 
parties, including countries with rather amicable relationships to the ingroup (Australia, 
The Netherlands). Study 1 further demonstrated the mediating roles of perceived threat 
and negative international images. When reminded of interstate war, American 
participants viewed an uninvolved, even fictitious, third-party state as more threatening, 
which in turn predicted heightened perceived negative international images of that state. 
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Negative images then led to increased support for violent responses to new, unrelated 
interstate tensions with other, real states. 
2.2.4 Statistical power.  A post-hoc power analysis using the G*Power program 
(Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996) revealed that on the basis of the average effect size 
for the main effects of condition (ηavg2 = .03), and a sample size of 164, the power to 
detect these main effects was 0.65. Although the power is relatively low, it is greater than 
the average power of 0.35 in the field of psychology (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 
2012), and we obtained significant, a priori hypothesized effects. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 2 
The main goal of Study 2 was to investigate potential moderators, thereby 
establishing boundary conditions of war contagion. If we accept that past interstate 
violence influences how citizens of the participating states perceive other interstate 
tensions and conflicts in the future, past interstate violence should then have the most 
profound impact on those citizens who are most psychologically invested in their own 
national groups. It has been well-documented that people who attach higher importance 
to their group are more sensitive to outgroup threat and display stronger intergroup bias 
when the ingroup is threatened (Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Riek, 
Mania, & Gaertner, 2006). Recent research on social identification proposes a 
bidimensional view of group identification, distinguishing between ingroup attachment 
and glorification (Roccas, Klar, & Liviatan, 2006). Whereas attachment refers to one’s 
subjective identification with the ingroup, glorification refers to beliefs in the superiority 
of the ingroup over outgroups and emphasizes loyalty and deference to ingroup norms 
and authorities. Research has revealed that glorification is negatively related to collective 
guilt for ingroup-committed transgressions, whereas attachment is positively related to 
collective guilt for ingroup-committed transgressions (Roccas et al., 2006). Similarly, 
when the ingroup (rather than an outgroup) was responsible for intergroup violence, 
glorification but not attachment predicted dehumanization of outgroup victims and 
decreased demands for justice (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010), as well 
as a shift from violence-condemning harm and fairness morals to violence-legitimizing 
loyalty and authority morals (Leidner & Castano, 2012).  
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In line with past research on group identification, we predicted that the extent to 
which individuals are psychologically invested in their national group will moderate the 
effects of past interstate violence on responses to ongoing interstate tensions. Strongly 
glorifying group members, at the very least those who are high on both glorification and 
attachment, should be most affected by past interstate violence, and therefore perceive 
other states as most negative and threatening, which should ultimately lead to most 
violent responses to new interstate tensions. In contrast, the ingroup’s past conflict with 
other states are unlikely to affect low glorifiers due to their lack of motivation or 
psychological need to defend the ingroup. Study 2 was therefore designed to examine the 
moderating roles of ingroup glorification and attachment in the war contagion 
phenomenon. In an effort to directly replicate our main findings in Study 1 (for the 
primacy of direct replications over conceptual replications see Simons, 2014), we 
employed the same manipulation materials in this study. 
3.1 Method 
3.1.1 Participants. The sample consisted of 180 Americans recruited through MTurk. A 
prescreening procedure was employed to prevent people who participated in Study 1 
from taking part in this study. After excluding eight participants who did not pay 
sufficient attention to the manipulation (as indicated by their summaries of the 
manipulation materials and incorrect answers to attention check questions), six 
participants who spent less than 30 seconds reading the manipulation material or 
significantly longer than the rest of the sample (outliers), 166 participants were retained 
for data analysis (49% men; age M = 33, SD = 12.08).  
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3.1.2 Procedure. Participants followed a similar procedure as in Study 1. Participants in 
the intra and interstate war conditions read the same New York Times articles about the 
American Civil War and the American Revolutionary War, respectively. Following the 
reading task, participants completed the same manipulation checks as in Study 1, and 
then summarized the news article in their own words. Afterwards, they filled out the 
dependent measures in the order outlined below. 
3.1.3 Materials. 
3.1.3.1 Support for violent responses to current interstate tensions. To measure support 
for violent and nonviolent solutions to new interstate tensions, participants were 
presented with three of the six international conflict scenarios that were used in Study 1. 
To maximize ecological validity, realism, and real-world applicability of our findings, we 
focused on countries that, at the time, had real tensions with participants’ own country 
(United States). Thus, the three scenarios described the tensions with Iran, North Korea, 
and China. 
3.1.3.2 National attachment and glorification. Attachment was measured with eight 
statements about the United States, tapping the importance of the U.S. to participants’ 
identity and their commitment to the U.S. (e.g., “Being American is an important part of 
my identity.”). Glorification was measured with eight statements tapping participants’ 
belief in American superiority over other countries, and their deference to American 
authorities (e.g., “The U.S. is better than other nations in all respects;” “It is disloyal for 
Americans to criticize the United States.”). These statements were adapted to the 
American context from Roccas et al.’s (2006) scales. Following others (e.g., Feygina, 
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Jost, & Goldsmith, 2009; Leidner et al., 2010), the moderators were administered at the 
end of the study in order to avoid raising participants’ suspicion about the study goal. 
3.2 Results and Discussion 
3.2.1 National attachment and glorification. Neither attachment (α =.94, M = 6.30, SD 
= 1.84), F(1, 165) = 0.71, p = .193, η2 = .01, nor glorification (α =.85, M = 4.56, SD = 
1.42), F(1, 165) = 0.31, p = . 580, η2 = .00, was significantly affected by condition, thus 
allowing us to use them, together with condition, as independent variables (IVs) in 
subsequent GLMs. 
3.2.2 Support for violent responses to current interstate tensions. A composite score 
for support for violent responses to the conflict scenarios7 (α = .76, M = 4.71, SD = 2.35) 
was submitted as a DV to a moderated regression analysis with condition as a categorical 
IV and glorification and attachment as continuous moderating variables (and all 
interaction terms between these variables). The analysis yielded the expected two-way 
interaction between glorification and condition (see Figure 3), F(1, 165) = 5.37, p = .022, 
η2 = .03 (LCI = .00, UCI = .10). Follow-up analyses revealed that participants who 
strongly glorified their ingroup (1 SD above the mean) were more likely to favor future 
interstate violence after reading about interstate war (M = 6.70) as compared to intrastate 
war, (M = 5.03), t(165) = 2.45, p = .015. In contrast, exposure to interstate or intrastate 
war did not have a significant effect on low glorifiers’ support for future violence; if 
anything, they showed the opposite tendency, t(165) = -1.19, p = .238.8 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  As in Study 1, we also conducted mixed ANOVA to test the within-subject effect of conflict scenario. The 
results again converged (see Supplementary Materials).	  
8 Concerned about the potential effects of demographic factors on participants’ attitude toward the Civil 
War and current U.S. foreign policies, we also conducted the same analysis while controlling for whether 
our American participants came from the Southern or Northern U.S., as well as their political orientation, 
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The interaction between attachment and condition was also significant, F(1, 165) 
= 5.93, p = .016, η2 = .04 (LCI = .00, UCI = .10). Participants who were low on 
attachment (1 SD below the mean) showed a similar pattern to those high on 
glorification--a reminder of interstate war (M = 5.90) increased these participants’ 
support for violence as compared to a reminder of intrastate war (M = 4.12), t(165) = 
2.45, p = .015. Strongly attached individuals did not show significantly differential 
support for future violence depending on condition; if anything, they exhibited the 
opposite pattern compared to weakly attached participants, t(165) = -1.39, p = .166. 
These findings suggest that highly glorifying and weakly attached participants in this 
study reacted in a similar manner after being exposed to inter- rather than intra-state war. 
The analysis also revealed a significant main effect of glorification, F(1, 165) = 16.29, p 
< .001, η2 = .09, indicating that glorification was positively associated with support for 
future violence regardless of condition, β = 1.06.9 No other effects reached significance, 
Fs(1, 165) < 1.20, ps > .275, η2s < .01. 
Study 2 confirmed our extended hypothesis that reminders of past interstate 
violence should matter the most, in terms of their effects on support for aggressive 
responses to contemporary interstate tensions, to people who strongly glorify their own 
country. Even though we did not hypothesize a moderating effect of attachment, previous 
research has demonstrated the positive role of attachment in intergroup relations (Roccas 
et al., 2006). In line with this research, strongly attached participants responded similarly 
to those who only weakly glorified their ingroup (i.e., no increased support for violence 
after reminders of interstate war). While it is not yet clear why interstate as compared to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and the results remained unchanged. Using these demographic characteristics as moderators also did not 
have any significant interaction effects on support for future interstate violence. 
9 When the effect is very strong, β values can slightly exceed 1.00 due to estimation errors.	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intrastate war led to more support for future interstate violence among weakly attached 
individuals, resembling the reactions of high glorifiers, this “mirror effect” among 
weakly attached individuals has emerged in other intergroup research as well. 
3.2.3 Statistical power. A post-hoc power analysis revealed that the statistical power to 
detect the interaction between condition and glorification was 0.62. Again, however, the a 
priori hypothesized interaction effect was significant, with patterns confirming our 
hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 4 
STUDY 3 
The main goal of Study 3 was to replicate and, most importantly, integrate the 
mediation and moderation findings of Study 1 and Study 2, respectively (see Figure 4 for 
the full conceptual model depicting the effects of past interstate war on future violence 
through perceived threat and images, moderated by glorification). We further tested 
whether the direction of the war contagion effect is indeed in the direction that we 
predicted. That is, inter-state warfare should increase the likelihood for other, unrelated 
wars. While the use of intrastate violence as the comparison condition in Study 1 and 2 
allowed us to rule out mere priming effects of past violence in general, it also raised the 
question of whether reminders of interstate war increased support of violence against 
other states – as the war contagion literature would predict – or whether reminders of 
intrastate war decreased support of violence. Thus, Study 3 included a baseline condition 
to clarify the direction of the previously observed effects.  
Additionally, we aimed to conceptually replicate the mediating role of a 
generalized negative perception of third-party states. To this end, we examined 
participants’ perceived threat from and perceived images of a real, rather than fictitious, 
country to investigate the hypothesis of a generalized effect for any third-party states. It is 
possible that in Study 1, participants perceived Coebia as more hostile after the interstate 
war reminder simply because they used the American response to the British colonial 
power as an anchor when making up their mind about an entirely unfamiliar country with 
no prior relationships with the United States. To further corroborate our interpretation of 
Study 1’s finding that the change in perceptions of Coebia reflected a general change in 
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perceptions of any foreign country, Study 3 investigated perceptions of a real country, 
China, where participants do have at least a general sense of the country and its relations 
to the United States. We also used more elaborate measures of international images and 
threat to further examine the different aspects of threat and image, as well as their distinct 
roles in predicting future interstate violence. 
4.1 Method 
4.1.1 Participants. The sample consisted of 311 Americans recruited through MTurk. 
After excluding seven participants who did not pay sufficient attention to the 
manipulation material (as indicated by their summaries of the materials and incorrect 
answers to attention check questions), 15 participants who did not take the experiment 
seriously (as indicated by suspicious response patterns, i.e. selecting the same answer for 
all questions), 18 participants who spent less than 30 seconds reading the manipulation 
material or significantly more time than the rest of the sample, 271 participants were 
retained for data analyses (40% men; age M = 36, SD = 13.55).  
4.1.2 Procedure. Participants followed a similar procedure as in Study 1 and 2. First, 
they were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: intrastate war, interstate war, and 
baseline. As in Study 1, participants in the intra and interstate war conditions read the 
same New York Times articles about the American Civil War and the American 
Revolutionary War, respectively. Following the reading task, participants in these two 
conditions completed the same manipulation checks as in the previous studies, and 
summarized the news article. Afterwards, they filled out the dependent measures in the 
order outlined below. In the baseline condition, participants completed the dependent 
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measures without reading any manipulation material or responding to manipulation 
checks.  
4.1.3 Materials. 
4.1.3.1 Symbolic and realistic threats. Three items measured perceived symbolic threat 
from China (e.g., “The family values in the U.S. are not compatible with those in 
China.”). Three items measured perceived realistic threat from China (e.g., “China’s 
economic development poses a threat to the American economy.”). 
4.1.3.2 International Images.  In addition to enemy, imperialist, and ally images, we also 
assessed perceived barbarian image of China (e.g., “Power in the hand of China is a 
dangerous thing.”) to test whether the effects observed in Study 1 can generalize to a 
different negative image. To enhance scale reliability, we also increased the number of 
items in each measure, again adapted from Alexander et al. (2005). 
4.1.3.3 Support for violent responses to current interstate tensions. As in Study 1 and 2, 
participants responded to the scenarios describing the nuclear program in Iran and the 
increasing tensions between the U.S. and North Korea. 
4.1.3.4 Ingroup attachment and glorification were measured identically to Study 2. 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
4.2.1 Main Analyses.10 
4.2.1.1 Ingroup attachment and glorification. Neither attachment (α =.95, M = 6.34, SD 
= 1.78), F(2, 270) = 1.30, p = .274, η2 = .01, nor glorification (α =.85, M = 4.84, SD = 
1.50), F(2, 270) = 0.06, p = . 938, η2 = .00, were affected by condition, thus allowing us 
to use them, together with condition, as IVs in the same GLMs as in Study 2. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  To directly replicate the findings of Study 1 and 2, we also analyzed the data with only participants in the 
intra and interstate war conditions, excluding those in the baseline condition. The results converged with 
the previous studies (see Supplementary Materials).	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4.2.1.2 Support for violent responses to current interstate tensions. The same moderated 
regression analysis with the composite score for support for new interstate violence11 (α = 
.80, M = 5.34, SD = 2.25) as the DV yielded a significant main effect of condition, F(2, 
272) = 3.35, p = .037, η2 = .03 (LCI = .00, UCI = .07), in that reading about interstate war 
(M = 5.81) increased participants’ support for future interstate violence as compared to 
reading about intrastate war (M = 5.14), t(272) = 2.56, p = .011, and marginally so to the 
baseline (M = 5.14), t(272) = 1.75, p = .082. In contrast, the intrastate war condition did 
not differ significantly from the baseline, t(272) = -0.97, p = .333. The main effect of 
condition was qualified by a three-way interaction of condition by glorification and 
attachment (see Figure 6), F(2, 272) = 3.23, p = .041, η2 = .02 (LCI = .00, UCI = .07). 
Follow-up analyses revealed that participants who strongly glorified and were strongly 
attached supported more violent solutions after reminders of interstate war (M = 7.15) as 
compared to the baseline (M = 6.28), t(272) = -2.01, p = .046, and the intrastate war 
condition (M = 6.18), t(272) = -2.00, p = .047. The intrastate war condition did not differ 
significantly from the baseline, t(272) = 0.21, p = .836. Participants who were high on 
glorification but low on attachment exhibited a similar pattern, such that they were 
significantly more supportive of future interstate violence after reading about interstate 
(M = 6.69) rather than intrastate war (M = 4.48), t(272) = -1.98, p = .049; the difference 
between the interstate war condition (M = 6.69) and the baseline (M = 5.12) was trending 
in the same direction, t(272) = -1.39, p = .166. Again, responses in the intrastate war 
condition and the baseline were not significantly different, t(272) = .60, p = .546. In 
contrast to strongly glorifying participants high or low on attachment, participants low on 
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  As in previous studies, we also conducted mixed ANOVA to test the within-subject effect of conflict 
scenario. The results again converged (see Supplementary Materials).	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both dimensions tended to be more supportive of future violence in the intrastate war 
condition (M = 4.50) than the baseline (M = 3.81), t(272) = -1.59, p = .114. The opposite 
pattern, though again not significantly so, occurred for individuals low on glorification 
but high on attachment, t(272) = 1.44, p = .152. No other simple effects reached 
significance, ts (272) < 1.18, ps > .240. The moderated regression analysis also revealed 
main effects of glorification and attachment, Fs(1, 272) > 8.85, p < .003, η2 > .03, 
indicating that both glorification and attachment were positively associated with support 
for future violence, βs > .53. No other effects reached significance, Fs < 1.46, p > .235, 
η2 < .01.12 
4.2.1.3 Factor analyses. As in Study 1, we first conducted factor analyses to assess 
whether the measures of perceived threats and international images loaded onto distinct 
factors as theory predicts (see Table 3 and 4 for the factor loading patterns). The factor 
analysis on all threat items revealed two factors (according to a scree plot and the 
“Eigenvalue > 1” criterion) corresponding to symbolic and realistic threat, respectively, 
thus allowing us to use them as two separate variables in subsequent analyses. The factor 
analysis on all image items, however, indicated that all four images loaded onto one 
factor, with items of ally image loading negatively and items of the other three images 
loading positively. Based on the factor analysis, we reverse scored the items of ally image 
and then created a new variable, negative image, combining all image items.13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 As in Study 2, controlling for whether participants come from the South or the North, as well as their 
political orientation, did not change the results. Using these demographic characteristics as moderators also 
did not have any significant interacting effects on support for future interstate violence. 
13	  The following results were virtually the same if we treated the negative images as three separate 
variables. 
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4.2.1.4 Symbolic threat. As predicted, a moderated regression analysis with perceived 
symbolic threat (α = .76, M = 4.11, SD = 1.77) as the DV yielded a significant interaction 
between condition and glorification (Figure 7), F(2, 272) = 3.62, p = .028, η2 = .03 (LCI 
= .00, UCI = .07). Simple effects revealed that participants who strongly glorified the 
U.S. perceived significantly more symbolic threat from China after reading about 
interstate war (M = 5.45) as compared to intrastate war (M = 4.05), t(272) = -2.76, p = 
.006, and the baseline (M = 4.46), t(272) = -1.99, p = .048. Low glorifiers, on the other 
hand, did not differ significantly in perceived symbolic threat depending on the condition 
they were assigned to, ts(272) < 1.37, ps > .172. The main effect of glorification was also 
significant, F(1, 272) = 12.41, p < .001, η2 = .05, indicating that glorification was 
positively associated with perceived symbolic threat, regardless of condition, β = .53. No 
other effects reached significance, Fs(1, 272) < 1.04, ps > .350, ηs2 < .01. 
4.2.1.5 Realistic threat. The same moderated regression analysis with perceived realistic 
threat (α =.85, M =5.69, SD = 1.87) as the DV yielded a significant main effect of 
attachment, F(1, 272) = 7.83, p = .006, η2 = .03, with attachment positively associated 
with perceived realistic threat from China, β = .45. The interaction between glorification 
and attachment was trending, F(1, 272) = 2.45, p = .119. No other effects reached 
significance, Fs(1, 272) < .46, ps > .633, ηs2 < .001. 
4.2.1.6 International images.  Analysis with perceived negative image of China (α =.81, 
M = 5.19, SD = 1.42) as the DV yielded a significant interaction between glorification 
and condition (Figure 8), F(2, 272) = 4.03, p = .019, η2 = .03 (LCI = .00, UCI = .07). 
High glorifiers held a significantly more negative image of China in the interstate war 
condition (M = 5.82) as compared to the baseline (M = 4.95), t(272) = -2.34, p = .020, 
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and marginally significantly so as compared to the intrastate war condition (M = 5.19), 
t(272) = -1.67, p = .095. Importantly, perceived negative image among participants in the 
intrastate war condition was not significantly different from that in the baseline, t(272) = 
-.66, p = .511. The manipulation did not have any significant effects on low glorifiers; if 
anything, they held a somewhat less negative image of China after the interstate war 
reminder (M = 4.62) than the intrastate war (M = 5.24) or no reminder (M = 5.15), ts(272) 
> 1.70, ps < .090. The analysis also revealed a main effect of ingroup attachment, F(1, 
272) = 4.58, p = .033, η2 = .02, with attachment positively associated with perceived 
negative image of China, β = .24. The interaction between glorification and attachment 
again reached significance, F(1, 272) = 6.98, p = .009, η2 = .03. Among highly attached 
participants, glorification was positively associated with perceived negative image, β = 
.35, t(272) = 2.91, p = .004. In contrast, among weakly attached participants, this positive 
relationship disappeared, β = -.05, t(272) = -0.36, p = .722. No other effects reached 
significance, Fs(1, 272) < .78, ps > .461, ηs2 < .01. 
4.2.2 Mediational Analyses. 
To test the multi-step mediational model of the effect of condition by glorification 
and attachment on support for violence in response to current interstate tensions through 
(a) perceived symbolic and realistic threat, and (b) perceived negative images of foreign 
countries (see Figure 4), we again conducted two sets of moderated mediational analyses, 
and a path model testing the whole model at once. In the first mediational analysis, 
condition was introduced as the IV, perceived symbolic and realistic threats as the 
mediators, glorification and attachment as the moderators, and perceived negative image 
as the DV (Hayes, 2012, model 8). The analysis revealed a significant indirect effect of 
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condition on perceived negative image through symbolic threat (boot coefficient = .30, 
LCI = .023, UCI = .590) when both glorification and attachment were high, but not when 
both dimensions of identification were low or only one of them was high. The indirect 
effect of condition through realistic threat was not significant, boot coefficient = .15, LCI 
= -.075, UCI = .367. 
In the second mediational analysis, condition was introduced as the IV, perceived 
negative image as the mediator, glorification and attachment as the moderators, and 
support for future violence as the ultimate DV. Consistent with our mediational 
hypothesis, the indirect effect of condition on support for violence through perceived 
negative image was significant when both glorification and attachment were high (boot 
coefficient = .47, LCI = .078, UCI = .991), but not for other combinations of glorification 
and attachment.  
To test all steps of our mediational model simultaneously, we conducted a path 
analysis in which condition was dummy coded with the baseline as the reference group. 
The dummy variables, glorification and attachment, and all interactions were used as 
exogenous variables. Perceived symbolic and realistic threat, negative image, and support 
for future interstate violence were introduced as endogenous variables. Mirroring our 
GLMs described above, we modeled the interaction between condition and glorification 
on perceived symbolic and realistic threat (the “step 1 mediators”). Perceived symbolic 
and realistic threat in turn significantly affected perceived negative image as the “step 2 
mediator”, which then led to support for future interstate violence as the ultimate 
outcome variable. In addition, glorification also directly affected perceived symbolic 
threat and support for future violence, whereas attachment directly affected realistic 
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threat and future violence. All the paths hypothesized in Figure 4 were significant. This 
model fit the data very well, with the desirable non-significant exact-fit index, χ2(40) = 
54.50, p = .063, and satisfactory close-fit indices, CFI = .99, NFI = .98, SRMSR = .04.14 
Study 3 essentially replicated the effects found in Study 1 and 2 with an additional 
baseline condition. Although we did not replicate the statistical two-way interaction 
effect of Study 2 – as Study 3 found a three-way interaction with regards to support for 
future interstate violence – this three-way interaction was driven by the low- (but not 
high-) glorification cells and the additional baseline (but not the intrastate war condition). 
Specifically, the difference between the interstate war condition and the baseline was 
only significant at high levels of both glorification and attachment, but not at high level 
of glorification and low level of attachment, whereas the difference between inter and 
intra state war was significant for both sets of participants. Thus, Study 2’s finding that 
high glorifiers support future interstate war more after reminders of past inter (rather than 
intra) state war was replicated in Study 3—as this difference was found in both high-
glorification cells. Most importantly, our mediational analyses replicated the effects of 
perceived threats and images regarding a fictitious country in Study 1 with a real third-
party country in Study 3, confirming that interstate violence is contagious because past 
experience of interstate violence induces a generalized perception of third-party states as 
threatening and hostile.  
While we were able to disentangle realistic and symbolic threat in this study, we 
again could not distinguish between different types of images. A potential explanation is 
that when the target country is completely unfamiliar or a strong rival like China, people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Supplementary Materials for results of the alternative models. 
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may hold more general negative perceptions without clearly differentiating between the 
multiple sub-aspects of negative perceptions. 
4.2.3 Statistical power. A post-hoc power analysis revealed that the statistical power to 
detect the three-way interaction of condition by glorification and attachment for support 
for future violence was 0.63, and the average power to detect the two-way interaction 
between condition and glorification for realistic threat and negative images was 0.80. 
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The current research demonstrated that interstate violence can spread across time 
and space by past interstate violence leading to more support for contemporary interstate 
violence, even with states not involved in the past violence, through increasing 
generalized perceived threat and negative images of foreign countries. Further, we 
identified boundary conditions of the generalization effect by examining the roles of 
national glorification and attachment. While these findings suggest that the proposed war 
contagion effect occurs among a subgroup of the population (i.e., high glorifiers), they 
should not be taken as reducing the importance of the phenomenon; rather, they add 
another layer of complexity important for the understanding of war contagion. Further, it 
is important to note that leaders and decision makers of a country are usually high 
glorifiers who have strong ties to the country they represent. 
5.1 The Generalization of Interstate Attitudes and Behavior 
The studies presented here contribute to the literature on the “violence begets 
violence” phenomenon by investigating how and why violence spreads across large 
social groups. The findings revealed a striking generalization effect of engaging in 
interstate violence in the remote past on attitudes and behavior toward uninvolved third-
party states. Extending prior research on the contagion of international war, the present 
work demonstrates that aggressive interstate behavior can be transferred to nation states 
that are both temporarily and spatially independent from the original war. This 
phenomenon speaks directly to the long-standing social psychological question of how 
attitudes in different domains link to each other across time and space (Bouman et al., 
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2013; Ranganath & Nosek, 2008; Shook et al., 2007). When explaining the indirect 
influence of contact between two primary groups on attitude towards secondary groups 
that are not involved in the initial contact, Pettigrew (2009) speculated that such transfer 
effects can emerge between two different attitudinal domains that are psychologically, 
but not necessarily logically, related to each other (also see Alvaro & Crano, 1997; 
Martin & Hewstone, 2008; Tausch et al., 2010). This notion is also applicable to our 
work on interstate war, the direct opposite to positive intergroup contact. Such negative 
(if vicarious) intergroup contact presents a similar psychological “trap” that attracts 
secondary outgroup targets that bear some resemblance to the primary target of violence 
– in our case, other foreign states – even though the new intergroup situation is not 
logically related to the original one.  
5.2 Alternative Explanations of the Contagion of Interstate Violence 
Although the findings from the present studies support our hypothesis that 
heightened negative perceptions of foreign states in general explain the increased support 
for future interstate violence, several alternative explanations exist for the observed war 
contagion phenomenon.15 Discussing generalized intergroup contact effects, Pettigrew 
(1997) also proposed that initial contact with an outgroup encourages ingroup members 
to adopt a more critical view on ingroup norms, cultures, and lifestyle, which leads to less 
psychological distance from outgroups in general. The possibility thus exists that the 
observed increase in support for future interstate violence after a reminder of past 
interstate war resulted from participants’ reappraisal of their own nation—for instance, 
they might have perceived the U.S. as more cohesive and powerful after reading about 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 We tested several possible alternative explanations such as negative and positive affect, ingroup pride, 
perceived severity and reprehensibility of the war. None of these variables explained the war contagion 
effect (see Supplementary Materials). 
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the Revolutionary War, which led to increased violent responses to new interstate 
tensions. Future research should examine the various aspects of ingroup appraisal, thus 
establishing a more complete account of why interstate violence is contagious. 
5.3 Generalizability of Interstate Violence Contagion 
Despite our focus on interstate violence, the contagion of violence may very well 
be generalizable to other intergroup contexts such as conflicts that take place within a 
nation. As briefly explained before, the Civil War reminder employed in our studies 
might increase negative perceptions of other subgroups within the U.S., which might 
consequently instigate support for aggressive policies or aggressive responses to 
contemporary tensions with minority groups belonging to the same superordinate national 
group. Therefore, our findings with regard to interstate violence have implications for 
understanding the perpetuation of group-based violence in general. 
Another important question that arises from the present research is the extent to 
which negative interstate experiences can generalize to influence attitude toward other 
uninvolved states. Will interstate wars other than the Revolutionary War elicit the same 
effects we demonstrated? Recognizing the value and importance of direct replication 
(Simons, 2014), we employed the same manipulation materials and the effects largely 
replicated across three studies. Yet, this approach necessarily neglects conceptual 
replication (e.g. for different interstate wars in the past). Thus it is unclear whether the 
observed carry-over effects of past interstate violence will hold for other interstate wars. 
The often-glorified American victory in the Revolutionary War begs the question of 
whether citizens of a state will be equally likely to support future interstate violence after 
being reminded, for instance, of a war perceived as unjust. Future research is thus 
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warranted to further examine the boundary conditions and generalizability of the current 
findings. Yet, considering the ubiquity and importance of the Revolutionary War and 
American Independence (e.g. Independence Day), rivaled by few, if any, other events in 
American history, the importance of the effects of this particular war should not be 
underestimated in any case. 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
Three experiments provided convergent evidence that exposure to a state’s past 
involvement in interstate violence increases its citizens’ support for future violence when 
confronted with tensions with previously uninvolved third-party states. The carry-over 
effects of past violent behavior were most pronounced among individuals who strongly 
glorify their country, and were explained by an increase in negative perceptions of other 
foreign states in general. The present work lays the foundation for future research on the 
scope of attitude generalization in intergroup violence in general and international 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
                                          Table 1 
Factor pattern for symbolic and realistic 
threats (Study 1). 
 





                                                                                                                         
                           
  








Table 2  
Rotated factor pattern for ally, enemy, and 
imperialist images (Study 1). 
 
                         Factor1        Factor2 
Enemy1                     0.96             0.00 
Enemy2                     0.94            -0.01 
Imperialist1               0.93             0.02 
Imperialist2               0.90            -0.01 
Ally1                        -0.02             0.92 
Ally2                         0.02              0.92 
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Table 3  
Rotated factor pattern for symbolic and realistic 
threats (Study 3). 
 
                                        Factor1         Factor2 
Realistic threat 1                    0.84             -0.08 
Realistic threat 2                    0.77              0.04 
Realistic threat 3                    0.72              0.11 
Symbolic threat 1                   0.05              0.80 
Symbolic threat 2                   0.10              0.78 
Symbolic threat 3                   0.04              0.48 
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Table 4 
Factor pattern for ally, enemy, imperialist, and 
barbarian images (Study 3). 
  
         Factor 1 
Barbarian 1 0.82 
Barbarian 2 0.81 
Enemy 1 0.80 
Enemy 2 0.80 
Imperialist 1 0.79 
Enemy 3 0.78 
Barbarian 3 0.76 
Imperialist 2 0.70 
Imperial 3 0.65 
Enemy 4 0.61 
Barbarian 4 0.59 
Enemy 5 0.36 
Ally 1 -0.43 
Ally 2 -0.64 
Ally 3            -0.65 
Ally 4 -0.67 
Ally 5            -0.72 
Ally 6 -0.74 
Ally 7 -0.79 





Figure 1. The conceptual model depicting the hypothesized effects of reminders of past 
interstate violence (as opposed to reminders of past intrastate violence) against State A on 
support for future interstate violence against State C through perceived symbolic and 
realistic threats, and international images of State B (as a stand-in for any foreign state).  
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Figure 2. The indirect effect of condition (past interstate vs. intrastate violence) on 
support for future interstate violence through perceived threat, negative and ally images. 
Solid paths were significant, dashed paths were not. 
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Figure 3. Support for violence as a function of past violence reminders (Revolutionary 
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Figure 4. Conceptual model of the hypothesized effects of reminders of past interstate 
violence (as opposed to reminders of past intrastate violence) on support for future 
interstate violence through perceived threats and international images of foreign 
countries, moderated by national identification. 
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Figure 5. Support for future violence as a function of past violence reminders 
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Figure 6. Support for future violence as a function of past violence reminders 
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Figure 7. Perceived symbolic threat as a function of past violence reminders 
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Figure 8. Perceived negative images as a function of past violence reminders 





















Study 1. In line with our hypothesis that negative perceptions of a third-party state are 
related to support for violence toward any third-party states in general, perceived images and 
threats of Coebia were correlated with support for violent responses to current tensions with Iran, 
North Korea, China, Russia, Australia, and the Netherlands. Support for future interstate violence 
against other third-party states was positively associated with perceived enemy image of Coebia, 
r = .16, p = .050, imperialist image of Coebia, r = .21, p = .010, realistic threat of Coebia, r = .17, 
p = .045, and marginally so with symbolic threat of Coebia, r = .14, p = .093. 
Study 3. In line with our hypothesis that negative perceptions of a third-party state are 
related to support for violence toward any third-party states in general, perceived images and 
threat of China were significantly correlated with support for violent solutions to current 
interstate tensions with Iran and North Korea. Support for future interstate violence with Iran and 
North Korea was negatively associated with perceived ally image of China, r = -.29, p < .001, and 
positively associated with perceived enemy image of China, r = .42, p < .001, barbarian image of 
China, r = .43, p < .001, imperialist image of China, r = .39, p < .001, symbolic threat of China, r 
= .41, p < .001, and realistic threat of China, r = .32, p < .001. 
Mixed ANOVA for Support for Future Interstate Violence 
Study 1. To provide a more fine-grained analysis that takes into account the differences 
between the six scenarios about contemporary international conflicts, we then conducted a mixed 
ANOVA in which condition was treated as a two-level between-subjects variable (condition: 
Revolutionary War vs. Civil War) and the different conflict scenarios as a six-level within-subject 
variable (scenario: Iran, North Korea, China, Russia, Australia, the Netherlands). Consistent with 
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the GLM, this analysis yielded a significant between-subjects effect of condition, F(1, 161) = 
4.17, p = .043, such that participants supported significantly more future violence after being 
reminded of the Revolutionary War than the Civil War. Not surprisingly, the within-subject main 
effect of conflict scenarios was also significant, F(5, 805) = 87.64, p < .001, indicating that 
support for interstate violence differed depending on the specific conflict scenario regardless of 
condition. The average score on each scenario indicated that support for violent responses toward 
the tension with North Korea was the strongest (M = 5.68), followed by Iran (M = 4.87) and 
Russia (M = 3.89), both of which were stronger than China (M = 2.68), Australia (M = 2.73), and 
the Netherlands (M = 2.59). Most importantly, however, the main effect of condition was not 
moderated by the type of scenario, F(5, 805) = .56, p = .730, indicating that the effect of 
condition was not specific to some but not other scenarios, but occurred across all. 
Study 2. To account for the potential differences between the three conflict scenarios, we 
again conducted a mixed ANOVA with one two-level between-subjects factor (condition: 
Revolutionary War vs. Civil War) and one three-level within-subject factor (scenario: Iran, North 
Korea, China). Additionally, we added glorification and attachment as two continuous 
moderators. Consistent with the GLM above, the analysis yielded significant two-way 
interactions between condition and glorification, F(1, 158) = 7.31, p = .008, and between 
condition and attachment, F(1, 158) = 7.49, p = .007. The main effect of glorification was 
significant as well, F(1, 158) = 12., p = .001. There was also a significant within-subject effect of 
conflict scenario, F(2, 316) = 58.05, p < .001. Participants’ average score on each scenario 
indicated that support for violent responses toward the tensions with North Korea (M = 4.60) and 
Iran (M = 4.87) were stronger than with China (M = 2.55). The two-way interaction between 
scenario and glorification was significant, F(2, 316) = 5.93, p = .003, indicating that glorification 
significantly predicted support for future violence against Iran, β = 1.05, t(316) = 3.59, p < .001, 
and North Korea, β = 1.08, t(316) = 1.32, p < .001, but not significantly so against China, β = .20, 
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t(316) = .88, p = .381. The interaction between scenario and condition approached significance, 
F(2, 316) = 2.38, p = .094, indicating that condition had a marginally significant main effect on 
support for future violence against Iran, F(1, 165) = 3.84, p = .052, but not against North Korea 
or China, Fs(1, 165) < .04, ps > .840. In line with expectations, the three-way interaction of 
scenario by condition and glorification did not reach significance, nor did the interaction of 
scenario by condition and attachment, Fs(2, 316) < .70, ps > .500. No other effect reached 
significance, Fs(2, 316) < 1.75, ps > .175. Thus, the interaction effect of condition by 
glorification on support for future interstate violence was not limited to any one country, but 
occurred across all three. 
Study 3. To account for the within-subject effect of conflict scenario, we then conducted 
the same mixed analysis as in Study 2. Once again, the results were consistent with the previous 
GLM. The analysis yielded a significant main effect of condition on support for future interstate 
violence, F(2, 261) = 3.35, p = .037, which was qualified by a three-way interaction of condition 
by glorification and attachment, F(2, 261) = 3.23, p = .041. The main effect of glorification was 
again significant, F(1, 261) = 15.22, p < .001, and so was the main effect of attachment, F(1, 261) 
= 8.85, p = .003. There was also a significant within-subject main effect of conflict scenario, F(1, 
261) = 5.28, p = .022. Support for violent responses toward the tension with North Korea (M = 
5.47) was stronger than with Iran (M = 5.20). The interaction between scenario and glorification 
was marginally significant, F(1, 261) = 3.46, p = .064. Once again, the association between 
glorification and support for future violence was stronger when the target country was Iran, β = 
.85, t(261) = 4.34, p < .001, than when it was North Korea, β = .51, t(261) = 2.57, p = .011. No 
other effect reached significance, Fs(1, 261) < 1.46, ps > .235. As scenario did not moderate the 
main effect of condition or its interactions with glorification and attachment, again the results 
reported above for the three-way interaction hold across both scenarios. 
Alternative Model Testing 
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  Study 1. In the “first-step” meditational analysis, we tested the alternative model with 
perceived negative image and ally image as the mediators and perceived threat as the DV. In this 
model, condition had a significant indirect effect on perceived threat through negative image 
(boot coefficient = .22, LCI =.037, UCI = .402), but not through ally image. Despite the statistical 
significance of both models, our hypothesized model is in line with image theory (i.e. perceived 
threat leads to the formation of negative international images), whereas the alternative model is 
not. We thus believe that the proposed model is a better model from a theoretical perspective, 
despite the statistical significance of the alternative model. We also tested the alternative model 
with condition as the IV, negative images, ally image, and threats as mediators in parallel with 
one another, and support for future violence as the DV. In this model, there was no significant 
indirect effect of condition on future violence through any of the mediators. We also conducted 
path analyses to test the alternative mediational models as specified above; unlike in the case of 
the analyses presented above, the alternative path models fit the data worse than the hypothesized 
path model, lending further support to our theory. 
Study 3. Again, in the “first-stage” mediation analysis, we tested the alternative models 
with perceived negative image as the mediator and perceived symbolic and realistic threats, 
respectively, as the outcome variable. These analyses yielded a significant indirect effect of 
condition on symbolic threat through negative image when both glorification and attachment 
were high (boot coefficient = .36, LCI = .038, UCI = .751) but, again, not when both dimensions 
of identification were low or only one of them was high. The indirect effect of condition on 
realistic threat did not reach significance (boot coefficient = .25, LCI = -.019, UCI = .610). These 
results are consistent with those in Study 1. Yet, as in Study 1, we contend that the hypothesized 
model is superior, as it is in line with image theory, whereas the alternative model is not. We also 
tested the alternative model with negative images, symbolic and realistic threats as mediators in 
parallel with one another. In this model, there was no significant indirect effect of condition on 
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future violence through any of the mediators. We also conducted path analyses to test the 
alternative mediational models as specified above. The alternative path models fit the data worse 
than the hypothesized path model, thus lending further support to our theory. 
Replication with only two conditions in Study 3 
To test whether our findings of Study 1 and 2 replicated in Study 3, we first conducted a 
moderated regression analysis with only participants in the Civil War and the Revolutionary War 
conditions, thus excluding those in the baseline condition (i.e. analyzing the same two conditions 
as in Study 1 and 2). This preliminary analysis yielded a significant main effect of condition, such 
that participants in the Revolutionary War condition (M = 5.81) were more supportive of future 
interstate violence than those in the Civil War condition (M = 5.14), F(1, 159) = 6.13, p = .014, η2 
= .04. The main effect of condition was further qualified by a three-way interaction of condition 
by glorification and attachment, F(1, 159) = 5.17, p = .024, η2 = .03 (Figure 5). Participants who 
were high on both attachment and glorification tended to support more future violence after 
reading about the Revolutionary War (M = 7.15) than the Civil War (M = 6.18), t(159) = -1.94, p 
= .055. Strongly glorifying but weakly attached participants exhibited the exact same pattern, 
favoring more violent conflict resolution in the Revolutionary War (M = 6.69) than in the Civil 
War condition (M = 4.48), t(159) = -1.92, p = .057. The manipulation did not significantly affect 
participants who were low on both dimensions of ingroup identification or those who were high 
on attachment but low on glorification, ts(159) < 1.14, ps > .255. The main effect of glorification 
was also significant, indicating a positive relationship between glorification and violent conflict 
resolution, F(1, 159) = 11.16, p = .001, η2 = .07, β = .78. Furthermore, analyses of the simple 
slopes indicated that among participants who read about the Revolutionary War, ingroup 
glorification significantly predicted stronger support for violent conflict resolution, β = 1.10, 
t(159) = 3.56, p = .001. In contrast, among participants who read about the Civil War, this 
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positive association between glorification and violent conflict resolution disappeared, β = .46, 
t(159) = 1.31, p = .194. No other effects reached significance, Fs(1, 159) < 3.35, ps > .069, ηs2 < 
.02. Although these effects are not perfectly in line with Study 2 where we found a two-way 
rather than a three-way interaction, they rendered further support for the hypothesis that 
experiencing interstate violence increases high ingroup glorifiers’ disposition to support violence 
when confronted with new international crises. Importantly, the three-way interaction in Study 3 
was driven by the low glorifier cells, not by the high glorifier cells; regardless of their level of 
attachment (high or low), high glorifiers showed the same (marginally) significant effects as in 
Study 2. Therefore, the occurrence of the war contagion effect for high but not low glorifiers was 
essentially replicated. 
To account for the potential within-subject effect of conflict scenario, we then conducted 
a mixed analysis with one 3-level between-subjects factor (condition: Revolutionary War vs. 
Civil War vs. baseline), one two-level within-subjects factor (scenario: Iran, North Korea), and 
two continuous between-subjects moderators (glorification and attachment) (and all the 
interactions between these variables). Consistent with the GLM above, this analysis yielded a 
significant main effect of condition on support for future interstate violence, F(1, 152) = 6.13, p 
= .014. The main effect of condition was further qualified by a three-way interaction of condition 
by glorification and attachment, F(1, 152) = 5.17, p = .024. The main effect of glorification was 
again significant, F(1, 152) = 11.16, p = .001, and the main effect of attachment approached 
significance, F(1, 152) = 3.35, p = .070. The analysis also revealed a trending two-way 
interaction between condition and glorification, F(1, 152) = 1.92, p = .168. The within-subject 
main effect of conflict scenario was also trending, F(1, 152) = 2.49, p = .117. Participants’ 
average score on each scenario indicated that support for violent responses toward the tension 
with North Korea (M = 5.58) was somewhat stronger than with Iran (M = 5.35), regardless of 
condition. The two-way interaction between scenario and glorification was marginally significant, 
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F(1, 152) = 3.70, p = .056, indicating that the association between glorification and support for 
future violence (regardless of condition) was stronger for Iran, β = 1.00, t(152) = 3.90, p < .001, 
than for North Korea, β = .56, t(152) = 2.12, p = .036. No other effect reached significance, Fs(1, 
152) < 0.61, ps > .436. As the within-subject variable of country did not interact with condition or 
condition’s interaction with the moderators, the mean differences for the main effect of condition 
as well as the simple effects of the three-way interaction between condition, glorification, and 
attachment are the same as reported in the GLM results above. 
Alternative Explanations 
Although the findings support our contention that the war contagion effect is due to the 
generalized negative perceptions of third-party states, a number of alternative explanations are 
also plausible. First, the manipulation materials might have differed in dimensions other than 
inter- vs. intra-state conflict, and such differences could potentially explain the observed effects 
on the main dependent variable of interest (i.e. support for violent response to current interstate 
tensions). For instance, the Revolutionary War reminder might have elicited more positive affect, 
stronger ingroup pride, or heightened perceived ingroup homogeneity than the Civil War 
reminder. Or the Civil War reminder might have elicited perceptions of diversity and 
heterogeneity within the state, and might have been perceived as more severe and reprehensible 
than the Revolutionary War reminder. To test these alternative explanations, we also measured 
the following variables that might account for the war contagion effects we obtained. 
Positive and negative affect. Participants’ positive affect (PA) and negative affect (NA) 
were assessed using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; see Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988), which consists of two 10-item mood scales for PA and NA, respectively. 
Participants were asked to rate the extent to which they were experiencing each particular affect 
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at this moment. Items from this measure were rated on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all; 9 = very 
much). 
Diversity beliefs. Based on Adesokan, Ullrich, van Dick, and Tropp (2011), participants’ 
beliefs about diversity in the United States were measured with seven items (e.g., “American 
society generally benefits from the involvement of people from different cultural backgrounds;” 
“Life in the United States would be more harmonious if the people living here were more similar 
to each other.”). 
Perceived homogeneity of Americans. Eight items were developed to measure 
perceived homogeneity of Americans (e.g., “Americans mostly share the same characteristics 
with respect to personality, attitudes, and behavior;” “You cannot make inferences about all 
Americans based on your knowledge of one single American.”). 
Ingroup pride. The ingroup pride measure was adopted from Cheryan & Monin 
(2005), with ten items tapping the extent to which participants took pride in the U.S. 
(e.g., “I am proud of America;” I criticize America;” “I am ashamed of America;” 
“Every time I hear the American national anthem, I feel strongly moved.”).  
Perceived severity and reprehensibility. Participants indicated how severe they 
perceived the war described in the news article (“How deadly was the conflict described 
in the article?” “How severe was the conflict described in the article?”). Perceived 
reprehensibility of the war was also measured with two items (“How reprehensible do 
you think it was for Americans to fight this war?” “How wrong do you think it was for 
Americans to fight this war?”). Items of these two measures were rated from 1 = not at 
all to 9 = extremely. 
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Results. The intrastate and interstate violence scenarios did not differ in terms of elicited 
negative affect, beliefs about diversity in the U.S., ingroup pride, and perceived homogeneity of 
the ingroup. However, the two conditions did differ in terms of elicited positive affect, and 
perceived severity and reprehensibility of the war. Participants reported significantly less positive 
affect, perceived the war as more severe and reprehensible when they were in the Civil War than 
the Revolutionary War condition. Yet, these (unsurprising) differences were not moderated by 
glorification, attachment, or the interaction between them, nor were they mediating any of the 
effects revealed by the subsequent analyses reported below. Thus, the differential effects on 
support for a violent response to interstate tensions among high and low glorifiers we report 
below cannot be traced back to these differences between the scenarios. 
 
  
	  	   	   	  59	  
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Alexander, M. G., Brewer, M. B., & Hermann, R. K. (1999). Images and affect: A 
functional analysis of out-group stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 77(1), 78-93. 
 
Alexander, M. G., Levin, S., & Henry, P. J. (2005). Image theory, social identity, and 
social dominance: Structural characteristics and individual motives underlying 
international images. Political Psychology, 26(1), 27–45. 
 
Alvaro, E. M., & Crano, W. D. (1997). Indirect minority influence: Evidence for leniency 
in source evaluation and counterargumentation. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 72(5), 949-964. 
 
Bakker, M., Dijk, A. van, & Wicherts, J. M. (2012). The Rules of the Game Called 
Psychological Science. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 7(6), 543–554.  
 
Bandura, A. (1973). Aggression: A social learning analysis. Oxford, England: Prentice-
Hall.  
 
Bouman, T., Zomeren, M., & Otten, S. (2013). Threat by association: Do distant 
intergroup threats carry-over into local intolerance? British Journal of Social 
Psychology. Advance Online Publication. 
 
Branscombe, N. R., Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1999). The context and 
content of social identity threat. In N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doosje (Eds.), 
Social identity: Context, commitment, content (pp.35–58). Oxford, UK: Blackwell 
Science. 
 
Carnagey, N. L., & Anderson, C. A. (2007). Changes in attitudes towards war and 
violence after September 11, 2001. Aggressive Behavior, 33(2), 118–129.  
 
Chandler, J., Mueller, P., & Paolacci, G. (2013). Nonnaïveté among Amazon Mechanical 
Turk workers: Consequences and solutions for behavioral researchers. Behavior 
Research Methods, 1–19. 
 
Cottam, R. W. (1977). Foreign policy motivation: A general theory and a case study. 
Pittsburg, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.  
 
Crescenzi, M. J. (2007). Reputation and interstate conflict. American Journal of Political 
Science, 51(2), 382–396. 
 
Erdfelder, E., Faul, F., & Buchner, A. (1996). GPOWER: A general power analysis 
program. Behavior Research Methods, Instruments, & Computers, 28(1), 1–11.  
 
	  	   	   	  60	  
Esses, V. M., Dovidio, J. F., & Hodson, G. (2002). Public attitudes toward immigration 
in the United States and Canada in response to the September 11, 2001 “Attack on 
America.” Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 2(1), 69–85. 
 
Feygina, I., Jost, J. T., & Goldsmith, R. E. (2010). System justification, the denial of 
global warming, and the possibility of “system-sanctioned change.” Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(3), 326–338.  
 
Goldstein, J. H., Davis, R. W., & Herman, D. (1975). Escalation of aggression: 
Experimental studies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31(1), 162-
170. 
 
Hayes, A. F. (2012). PROCESS: A versatile computational tool for observed variable 
mediation, moderation, and conditional process modeling [White paper]. 
Retrieved from http://www.afhayes.com/ public/process2012.pdf  
 
Herrmann, R. K., Tetlock, P. E., & Visser, P. S. (1999). Mass public decisions to go to 
war: A cognitive-interactionist framework. American Political Science Review, 
553–573. 
 
Herrmann, R. K., Voss, J. F., Schooler, T. Y., & Ciarrochi, J. (1997). Images in 
international relations: An experimental test of cognitive schemata. International 
Studies Quarterly, 41(3), 403–433. 
 
Houweling, H. W., & Siccama, J. G. (1985). The epidemiology of war, 1816-1980. 
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 29(4), 641–663. 
 
Huesmann, L. R. (2011). The contagion of violence: The extent, the processes, and the 
outcomes. In D. M. Patel & R. M. Taylor (Eds.), Social and economic costs of 
violence: Workshop summary. (pp. 63–69). Washington, DC: National Academies 
Press. 
 
Kedera, K. M. (1998). Transmission, barriers, and constraints: A dynamic model of the 
spread of war. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 42(3), 367–387. 
 
Leach, C. W., & Spears, R. (2009). Dejection at in-group defeat and schadenfreude 
toward second-and third-party out-groups. Emotion, 9(5), 659-665. 
 
Leach, C. W., Spears, R., Branscombe, N. R., & Doosje, B. (2003). Malicious pleasure: 
schadenfreude at the suffering of another group. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 84(5), 932-943. 
 
Leidner, B., & Castano, E. (2012). Morality shifting in the context of intergroup violence. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 42(1), 82–91.  
 
	  	   	   	  61	  
Leidner, B., Castano, E., Zaiser, E., & Giner-Sorolla, R. (2010). Ingroup glorification, 
moral disengagement, and justice in the context of collective violence. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(8), 1115–1129.  
 
LeVine, R. A., & Campbell, D. T. (1972). Ethnocentrism: Theories of conflict, ethnic 
attitudes, and group behavior. New York: Wiley. 
 
Levy, J. S. (1982). The contagion of great power war behavior. American Journal of 
Political Science, 26(3), 562–584. 
 
Long, W. J., & Brecke, P. (2003). Rethinking rationality in social theory. In War and 
Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution (pp. 121-146). 
Boston, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Martin, R., & Hewstone, M. (2008). Majority Versus Minority Influence, Message 
Processing and Attitude Change: The Source-Context-Elaboration Model. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 40, 237–326. 
 
Monin, B., & Oppenheimer, D. M. (2014). The limits of direct replications and the virtues 
of stimulus sampling, 45(4), 299-300. 
 
Most, B. A., & Starr, H. (1990). Theoretical and logical issues in the study of 
international diffusion. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2(4), 391–412. 
 
Patel, D. M., Simon, M. A., Taylor, R. M., & Rapporteurs. (2013). Contagion of 
Violence: Workshop Summary. Washington, D.C., US: National Academies Press. 
 
Pettigrew, T. F. (1997). Generalized intergroup contact effects on prejudice. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(2), 173–185. 
 
Pettigrew, T. F. (2009). Secondary transfer effect of contact. Social Psychology, 40(2), 
55–65. 
 
Ranganath, K. A., & Nosek, B. A. (2008). Implicit attitude generalization occurs 
immediately; explicit attitude generalization takes time. Psychological Science, 
19(3), 249–254. 
 
Riek, B. M., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2006). Intergroup threat and outgroup 
attitudes: A meta-analytic review. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 
10(4), 336–353. 
 
Roccas, S., Klar, Y., & Liviatan, I. (2006). The paradox of group-based guilt: Modes of 
national identification, conflict vehemence, and reactions to the in-group’s moral 
violations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(4), 698–711.  
 
	  	   	   	  62	  
Sherif, M., & Sherif, C. W. (1953). Groups in harmony and tension; an integration of 
studies of intergroup relations. New York, NY: Harper. 
 
Sherif, M., & Sherif, C. W. (1979). Research on intergroup relations. In W. G. Austin & 
S.  Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 24–29). 
 
Shook, N. J., Fazio, R. H., & Richard Eiser, J. (2007). Attitude generalization: Similarity, 
valence, and extremity. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43(4), 641–
647. 
 
Simons, D. J. (2014). The value of direct replication. Perspectives on Psychological 
Science, 9(1), 76–80. 
 
Siverson, R. M., & Starr, H. (1991). The diffusion of war: A study of opportunity and 
willingness. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.  
 
Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (2000). An integrated threat theory of prejudice. In S. 
Oskamp (Ed.) Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination (pp. 23–45). Mahwah, NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
 
Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., & Bachman, G. (1999). Prejudice toward immigrants: An 
integrated threat theory. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 29, 2221-2237. 
 
Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., Martinez, C., Schwarzwald, J., & Tur-Kaspa, M. (1998). 
Prejudice toward Immigrants to Spain and Israel: An integrated threat theory 
analysis. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 29, 559-576. 
 
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2007). Using multivariate statistics (5th ed.). Boston, 
MA: Allyn & Bacon/Pearson Education. 
 
Tausch, N., Hewstone, M., Kenworthy, J. B., Psaltis, C., Schmid, K., Popan, J. R., … 
Hughes, J. (2010). Secondary transfer effects of intergroup contact: Alternative 
accounts and underlying processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
99(2), 282-302. 
 
Walter, B. F. (2004). Does conflict beget conflict? Explaining recurring civil war. 
Journal of Peace Research, 41(3), 371–388. 
 
Widom, C. S. (1989a). Does violence beget violence? A critical examination of the 
literature. Psychological Bulletin, 106(1), 3-28. 
 
Widom, C. S. (1989b). Child abuse, neglect, and adult behavior: research design and 
findings on criminality, violence, and child abuse. American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry, 59(3), 355-367. 
 
	  	   	   	  63	  
Wohl, M. J., & Branscombe, N. R. (2009). Group threat, collective angst, and ingroup 
forgiveness for the war in Iraq. Political Psychology, 30(2), 193–217. 
 
 
